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EXECUTIVE UNDERREACH, IN PANDEMICS AND OTHERWISE
By David E. Pozen* and Kim Lane Scheppele**
ABSTRACT
Legal scholars are familiar with the problem of executive overreach, especially in emergen-
cies. But sometimes, instead of being too audacious or extreme, a national executive’s attempts
to address a true threat prove far too limited and insubstantial. In this Essay, we seek to define
and clarify the phenomenon of executive underreach, with special reference to the COVID-19
crisis; to outline ways in which such underreach may compromise constitutional governance
and the international legal order; and to suggest a partial remedy.
Legal scholars are familiar with the problem of executive overreach. Especially in emergen-
cies, presidents and prime ministers may claim special powers that are then used to curb civil
liberties, marginalize political opponents, and subvert the rule of law. Concerns about over-
reach have surfaced once again in the wake of COVID-19,1 as governments across the globe
have taken extreme measures to tackle the virus.
Yet in other countries, including the United States and Brazil, a very different and in some
respects opposite problem has arisen, wherein the national executive’s efforts to control the
pandemic have been disastrously insubstantial and insufficient. Because so many public law
doctrines reflect fears of overreach, President Trump’s and President Bolsonaro’s responses to
COVID-19 have left the legal community flat-footed. In this Essay, we seek to define and
clarify the phenomenon of executive underreach, with special reference to the COVID-19 crisis;
to outline ways in which executive underreach may compromise constitutional governance
and the international legal order; and to suggest a partial remedy.
I. IDENTIFYING AND EXPLAINING EXECUTIVE UNDERREACH
When lawyers worry about executive branch responses to emergencies, they typically envi-
sion a president or primeminister who presses legal boundaries or invokes extraordinary pow-
ers to manage a claimed crisis, jeopardizing human rights and democratic norms in the
process.2 The Bush administration’s “War on Terror” following the attacks of September
* Charles Keller Beekman Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
** Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Sociology and International Affairs in the School of Public and
International Affairs and University Center for Human Values, Princeton University.
1 See, e.g., SelamGebrekidan, For Autocrats, and Others, Coronavirus Is a Chance to Grab EvenMore Power, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 14, 2020), at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/30/world/europe/coronavirus-governments-
power.html.
2 See generallyOREN GROSS & FIONNUALA NÍ AOLÁIN, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS: EMERGENCY POWERS IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE (2006).
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11, 2001, furnishes a paradigmatic contemporary example. Such executive overreach may be
difficult to resist in practice, but the problem itself is well known.
The idea of executive underreach is more novel, although versions of it have attracted atten-
tion in discrete legal contexts. U.S. administrative law scholars, for instance, have considered
the circumstances under which agency “inaction” ought to trigger review by a court or other
body,3 while constitutional scholars have considered the circumstances under which the pres-
ident may decline to enforce a validly enacted statute.4 The problem of underreach, however,
generalizes across legal systems and thus warrants a broader treatment.
We can define executive underreach, preliminarily, as a national executive branch’s willful
failure to address a significant public problem that the executive is legally and functionally
equipped (though not necessarily legally required) to address. This definition, unavoidably, con-
tains multiple ambiguities. Perhaps most important, what is the baseline of appropriate action
against which “failure” is to be identified? Some measure of the substantive need, legislative
preference, or popular demand for executive exertion? The behaviors of similarly situated
executives in other jurisdictions?
We submit that failure is best understood, for present purposes, relative to the expectations
for executive action enshrined in a state’s own laws and in applicable international law norms.
That is, underreach occurs when domestic and international legal sources are widely seen to
authorize, if not also encourage or oblige, an executive to tackle a particular sort of problem
with particular sorts of tools and yet the executive declines to do so. As amatter of positive law,
an underreaching executive could do muchmore to protect the population from an imminent
threat to its health, safety, or welfare. As a matter of political morality, an underreaching exec-
utive should do more, given the severity of the threat and the rationale behind the executive’s
delegated or inherent power to confront it.5
Many executive branch omissions and abstentions do not count as underreach in our sense,
even when they are intentional. In some cases, the relevant decision makers may credibly fear
that they lack legal authority to act. In other cases, they may have ample authority but lack the
material or institutional resources needed to make meaningful headway on a problem.
“Underreach” assumes the practicability as well as the legality of “reaching” further; a minimal
level of state capacity is a prerequisite. Above that threshold, underreach also implies a want of
effort, not just of results. Reasonably competent and conscientious attempts to address a
problem that turn out to be unsuccessful are not willful failures under our definition.
Especially in conditions of uncertainty, executives must be afforded a margin of appreciation
to experiment with different policies. In short, given the critical connotations of the label and
the parallel literature on overreach, we propose to limit the concept of executive underreach to
3 See, e.g., Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency Inaction, 101
GEO. L.J. 1337 (2013); Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction AfterHeckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
653 (1985).
4 See, e.g., Dawn E. Johnsen, Presidential Non-enforcement of Constitutionally Objectionable Statutes, 63 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 7 (2000); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Executive’s Duty to Disregard Unconstitutional
Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 1613 (2008).
5 Our proposed definition of executive underreach thus combines descriptive and normative elements—as we
believe is fitting for a term like underreach that embeds a negative judgment. Although commentators rarely take
care to specify what they mean by “executive overreach,” virtually all discussions of that phenomenon appear to do
likewise. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Rights and Votes, 121 YALE L.J. 1286, 1302 (2012) (associating executive
overreach with presidential “aggrandize[ment]” and “sacrifice” of rights).
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situations where an executive sees a significant threat coming, has access to information about
what might mitigate or avert the threat along with the power to set a potentially effective plan
in motion, and refuses to pursue such a plan.
So defined, executive underreach might seem to raise a puzzle: if presidents and primemin-
isters typically “take their political fortunes to depend upon perceptions of efficaciousness and
accomplishment,”6 why would they ever willfully fail to address a significant problem?
Shouldn’t their electoral and reputational incentives point instead toward overreach, partic-
ularly when national security is at stake? Often that will indeed be the case. But some chief
executives may be so uninformed or unhinged, or so resigned to losing office, that they ignore
these incentives or fundamentally misperceive them. Other executives may be drawn to
underreach for a range of more pedestrian reasons—from procedural and bureaucratic barri-
ers to implementing their preferred policies, to a desire to shift blame and avoid responsibility,
to a fear of alienating key supporters who would prefer passivity, to a political time horizon
that leads them to discount future consequences of inaction, to a political program that dis-
parages “big government” and promises to shrink it, to collective action difficulties that raise
the expected cost or reduce the expected benefit of assertive action by a single state. More
ominously, an incumbent may wish to capitalize on the chaos that follows from underreach
and distract political or institutional rivals while he or she grabs power. Underreach, accord-
ingly, may be a perfectly “rational” political tactic even if it disserves the public good.
Moreover, a variety of transnational trends may be increasing the risk of particularly per-
nicious forms of executive underreach. These trends include the degradation of liberal dem-
ocratic institutions and the rise of authoritarian and proto-authoritarian leaders who trade in
falsehoods and sneer at expertise;7 the polarization of political blocs within numerous democ-
racies and the opportunities this creates to adopt policies that benefit only certain constitu-
encies;8 the growth of executive power at the domestic level resulting from executive
prominence in international networks and forums;9 and the intensification of threats, such
as climate change and internet security, that demand a global response.10 National executive
branches also tend to house the state’s most physically coercive institutions, including the
military and security agencies. While legislative underreach and judicial underreach are
also important phenomena worthy of study, the executive variant therefore warrants special
scrutiny.
6 David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 20 n. 78 (2014).
7 See generally TOM GINSBURG & AZIZ Z. HUQ, HOW TO SAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 68–119 (2018)
(discussing the global spread of “democratic erosion”); V-DEM INST., DEMOCRACY REPORT 2020:
AUTOCRATIZATION SURGES—RESISTANCE GROWS (2020), available at https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/
f0/5d/f05d46d8-626f-4b20-8e4e-53d4b134bfcb/democracy_report_2020_low.pdf (documenting the trend
toward autocratization).
8 Cf. STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE 81–87 (2018) (cataloging ways in which
aspiring autocrats attack the opposition through policies with disparate political impact).
9 SeeMARTIN S. FLAHERTY, RESTORING THE GLOBAL JUDICIARY: WHY THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD RULE IN U.S.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 158–63 (2019) (arguing that globalization has empowered executives within their own legal sys-
tems); Kim Lane Scheppele, Global Security Law and the Challenge to Constitutionalism After 9/11, 2011 PUB. L.
353 (arguing that the internationalization of security law has strengthened national executives at home).
10 See Benjamin Ewing &Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Government in an Era of Unlimited Harm,
121 YALE L.J. 350, 352–54 (2011) (suggesting that the diffuse, complex, and interconnected nature of contem-
porary threats to social welfare increases the risk of “government underreach”).
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II. EXECUTIVE OVERREACH AND UNDERREACH IN RESPONSE TO COVID-19
The COVID-19 crisis has generated dramatic examples of executive overreach and under-
reach. The crisis is still unfolding as we write this in late June 2020, and we can provide only a
cursory summary here. Yet by juxtaposing the approach taken thus far by Hungarian Prime
Minister Viktor Orbán with the approach taken by U.S. President Donald Trump and
Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, we can begin to illustrate what overreach and underreach
look like in a pandemic—and some of the surprising affinities between the two.
Before turning to those cases, it bears emphasis that executive responses to COVID-19 do
not reflect a clear pattern of either overreach or underreach in the aggregate. Most states
already had on the books, prior to 2019, some combination of public health laws and emer-
gency constitutional powers enabling their executives to cope with an outbreak of infectious
disease.11 And while executives around the globe have adopted policies shuttering businesses
and restricting civil liberties, most of these policies—such as stay-at-home orders, curfews,
limitations on large gatherings, mask-wearing requirements, and testing and tracing pro-
grams—have rested on a plausible legal as well as epidemiological basis.12 No doubt many
missteps have been made, but at least since COVID-19 was declared a pandemic by the
World Health Organization (WHO) on March 11, 2020, the measures taken by national
executives by and large appear to reflect good faith attempts to meet a genuine crisis with
a proportionate response.13
Against this backdrop, Prime Minister Orbán’s response to the pandemic stands out.
Orbán initially followed the Hungarian Basic Law’s provisions for “special legal orders” in
declaring an emergency on March 11.14 Under these provisions, the prime minister may
issue a decree to initiate a “state of danger,” but the state of danger automatically lapses
after fifteen days unless parliament extends it.15 Orbán then moved to eliminate this
constraint. He put before parliament a new law granting him the power to issue decrees
that “suspend the application of certain Acts, derogate from the provisions of Acts[,] and
take other extraordinary measures” for the duration of the current state of danger, the end
11 Cf. Tom Ginsburg & Mila Versteeg, Binding the Unbound Executive: Checks and Balances in Times of
Pandemic 23 (June 9, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract¼3608974 (report-
ing that in a global study of national government responses to COVID-19, “58% of the countries surveyed thus far
have relied on legislation,” while “just 36% of the countries . . . declared a state of emergency”).
12 See id. at 5–6 (finding that “in many countries, checks and balances have remained robustly in place during
the current health crisis,” with legislatures and especially courts playing an active oversight role, and characterizing
these findings as “encouraging to those worried about . . . abuse of executive power”); see alsoThomas Hale, Noam
Angrist, Beatriz Kira, Anna Petherick, Toby Phillips & Samuel Webster, Variation in Government Responses to
COVID-19 10 (Blavatnik Sch. of Gov’t, Working Paper 2020/032 Version 6.0, May 2020), available at https://
www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2020-05/BSG-WP-2020-032-v6.0.pdf (finding that from March 1 to May
27, countries generally “increase[d] their policy response as their number of confirmed COVID-19 cases r[o]se,”
albeit with “significant variation in the rate and timing of this relationship”).
13 But see note 21 infra (noting additional examples of arguable executive underreach).
14 Hungary’s current constitution, also known as its fundamental or basic law, went into effect on January 1,
2012. MAGYARORSZÁG ALAPTÖRVÉNYE, English translation available at https://njt.hu/translated/doc/
TheFundamentalLawofHungary_20190101_FIN.pdf. Its detailed provisions on “special legal orders” can be
found in Articles 48 through 54.
15 Id. § 53(3).
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of which would be determined by Orbán himself.16 The law also cancelled scheduled elec-
tions and created new criminal offenses for stating or disseminating “any untrue fact or any
misrepresented true fact” regarding the pandemic, among other innovations.17 Writing itself
out of the pandemic response, the Hungarian Parliament passed this law on March 29.
Prime Minister Orbán wasted no time issuing emergency decrees under the “Enabling
Act,” as it came to be known. While some of these decrees echoed measures being taken
by other countries, many had little to do with the pandemic.18 For instance, military com-
manders were put in charge of every hospital and military teams were inserted into “strategic
companies,” from which they exfiltrated data about employees and clients for no apparent
public health reason. Other decrees punished political opponents by redirecting tax revenue
away from cities where they had gained control. As criticism of the Enabling Act from
European institutions, foreign governments, and the international press mounted, Orbán
declared in lateMay that he would end the state of danger inmid-June. At that time, however,
parliament passed another bill effectively giving Orbán back under a different legal rubric
most of the powers he had ostensibly just relinquished.19 The new law authorizes Orbán
not only to issue decrees on a nearly unlimited range of subjects but also to direct the military
to use force against civilians inside Hungary “up to but not including death.”20 To date,
Hungary offers the most blatant and alarming example of executive overreach in the
COVID-19 crisis.
Meanwhile, in the twomost populous countries in the Americas, executive responses to the
pandemic unfolded in a starkly contrasting manner. Brazil’s President Bolsonaro and the
United States’ President Trump were widely seen before COVID-19 as demagogic populists
with authoritarian tendencies. One might have expected them to follow Orbán in exploiting
the pandemic to demonstrate decisiveness and consolidate power. Instead, both presidents
have flaunted their underreach.21
16 2020 évi XII. (III.30) törvény, a koronavírus elleni védekezésről, English translation available at https://
perma.cc/9LMR-YS3L. The quoted language is from Section 2(1).
17 Id. §§ 6, 337.
18 For explanation of these decrees, see GáborHalmai&KimLane Scheppele,Don’t Be Fooled by Autocrats! Why
Hungary’s Emergency Violates Rule of Law, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Apr. 22, 2020), at https://verfassungsblog.de/dont-
be-fooled-by-autocrats; Gábor Halmai & Kim Lane Scheppele, Orbán Is Still the Sole Judge of His Own Law,
VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Apr. 30, 2020), at https://verfassungsblog.de/orban-is-still-the-sole-judge-of-his-own-law.
19 See Gwendoline Delbos-Corfield, We Can’t Fall for Viktor Orbán’s Masquerade, EURACTIV (June 19,
2020), at https://www.euractiv.com/section/freedom-of-thought/opinion/we-cant-fall-for-viktor-orbans-
masquerade.
20 See Gábor Halmai & Kim Lane Scheppele, The Moment for Lies, EURACTIV (June 26, 2020), at https://
www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/opinion/the-moment-for-lies.
21 Additional democracies in which executive underreach is a plausible diagnosis since March 11 include
Mexico and the United Kingdom. See, e.g., William Booth, Boris Johnson and His Ministers Accused of Bungling
Coronavirus Response, Unleashing Disaster, WASH. POST (Apr. 20, 2020), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/europe/boris-johnson-and-his-ministers-criticized-for-response-to-coronavirus-threat/2020/04/20/
6e3d24e8-830a-11ea-81a3-9690c9881111_story.html; Vanda Felbab-Brown, AMLO’s Feeble Response to
COVID-19 in Mexico, BROOKINGS (Mar. 30, 2020), at https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/
03/30/amlos-feeble-response-to-covid-19-in-mexico. Another notable case is that of Sweden, which controver-
sially declined to impose a lockdown. But Sweden seems to us better classified as a good faith outlier than a willful
underreacher, as its health authorities took a wide range of preventive measures—some of them mandatory, some
advisory, all justified in a deliberative fashion—under constraints imposed by the Swedish constitution. See Lars
Jonung, Sweden’s Constitution Decides Its Exceptional COVID-19 Policy, VOXEU.ORG (June 18, 2020), at https://
voxeu.org/article/sweden-s-constitution-decides-its-exceptional-covid-19-policy.
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President Trump’s anemic response to COVID-19 has been well documented in the U.S.
press.22 Throughout the winter of 2020, Trump minimized the danger posed by the virus,
declined to order the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to prioritize it, ignored a
National Security Council playbook on fighting infectious diseases, and failed to ensure
adequate production and distribution of test kits, ventilators, or protective medical gear. A
law called the Defense Production Act of 1950 (DPA) has long empowered U.S. presidents
to order private companies to manufacture scarce supplies that are essential to the national
defense, yet Trump did not utilize this law until late March, and even then in a manner that
fell far short of what many experts recommended.23 This reticence looks all the more remark-
able in light of the Defense Department’s routine use of the DPA to clear delays in the defense
supply chain—an estimated 300,000 times annually in recent years.24 The Trump adminis-
tration likewise refused to dispense medical supplies from the national stockpile until late
March, at which point it seems to have favored states with Republican governors.25
Trump has additionally threatened to pull the United States out of theWHO; peddled dubi-
ous and dangerous cures; refused to wear a face mask in public; criticized governors who
imposed lockdowns or followed public health advice to reopen gradually; and, by June
2020, started holding largely mask-free indoor rallies to gin up support for his reelection.
President Bolsonaro’s response to COVID-19 mirrors President Trump’s in numerous
respects. Bolsonaro, too, has downplayed the danger posed by the virus, threatened to with-
draw from the WHO, touted the efficacy of unproven treatments, made inaccurate claims
about death counts, encouraged anti-lockdown protests, defied social distancing guidelines
issued by his own health ministry, berated governors for closing down the economy, and
pushed for a speedier reopening.26 Bolsonaro also fired his health minister, whose successor
resigned less than a month into the job.27 Unlike Trump, Bolsonaro has faced meaningful
pushback from the national congress and from the courts;28 one federal judge recently
ordered him to wear a face mask in Brasília or else pay a daily fine.29 Like Trump,
Bolsonaro nonetheless continues to deny responsibility and cultivate chaos. Confronted by
22 See, e.g., Cameron Peters, ADetailed Timeline of All theWays Trump Failed to Respond to the Coronavirus, VOX
(June 8, 2020), at https://www.vox.com/2020/6/8/21242003/trump-failed-coronavirus-response.
23 SeeGavin Bade,Despite Expanded DPA, Confusion Reigns over Coronavirus Industrial Response, POLITICO (Apr.
3, 2020), at https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/03/trump-dpa-medical-goods-164036.
24 Zolan Kanno-Youngs & Ana Swanson, Wartime Production Law Has Been Used Routinely, but Not with
Coronavirus, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2020), at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/31/us/politics/coronavirus-
defense-production-act.html.
25 See Aaron Rupar, How Trump Turned Ventilators into a Form of Patronage, VOX (Apr. 10, 2020), at https://
www.vox.com/2020/4/10/21215578/trump-ventilators-coronavirus-cory-gardner-colorado-jared-polis-
patronage.
26 SeeOmar G. Encarnación, Brazil Is Suffering. Bolsonaro Isn’t, FOR. POL’Y (May 28, 2020), at https://foreign-
policy.com/2020/05/28/brazil-is-suffering-bolsonaro-isnt.
27 See Ernesto Londoño, Another Health Minister in Brazil Exits amid Chaotic Coronavirus Response, N.Y. TIMES
(May 29, 2020), at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/15/world/americas/brazil-health-minister-bolsonaro.
html.
28 For an early account, see Emilio Peluso Neder Meyer & Thomas Bustamante, Authoritarianism Without
Emergency Powers: Brazil Under COVID-19, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Apr. 8, 2020), at https://verfassungsblog.de/
authoritarianism-without-emergency-powers-brazil-under-covid-19.
29 SeeTomPhillips, Brazilian Judge Tells Bolsonaro to Behave andWear a FaceMask, GUARDIAN (June 23, 2020),
at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/23/brazilian-judge-tells-bolsonaro-to-behave-and-wear-a-face-
mask.
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a journalist in late April about Brazil’s rising death toll, Bolsonaro responded with a partic-
ularly pointed version of the underreacher’s credo: “So what? . . . What do you want me to
do?”30
It is all but impossible to quantify with precision the public health harms specifically attrib-
utable to Trump’s or Bolsonaro’s behaviors.31 But it is safe to say that both countries have
suffered from their administrations’ underreach. As we write, infection rates continue to soar
in Brazil and the United States, which lead all other countries by a factor of two and four,
respectively, in number of confirmed COVID-19 cases.32
III. THE DANGERS OF UNDERREACH
Almost by definition, executive overreach and underreach involve suboptimal responses to
public problems. An overreaching executive misallocates resources by overstating a particular
risk or overinvesting in a problematic solution, thereby jeopardizing people’s “negative” rights
and interests in being spared intrusive forms of state interference. An underreaching executive
misallocates resources by understating a particular risk or underinvesting in a valuable solu-
tion, thereby jeopardizing people’s “positive” rights and interests in enjoying safety, security,
or other goods. What makes executive overreach a distinctive phenomenon, however, is not
so much its direct costs for affected parties—who may also be harmed by countless legislative
and judicial decisions—as its indirect, second- and third-order costs for state and society. As
many scholars have discussed in the context of other emergencies, executive overreach can
generate negative externalities ranging from the normalization of draconian measures and
alarmist rhetorics to the militarization of public policy to the concentration of power in
one set of institutions and the erosion of rule-of-law values.33
The potential negative externalities of executive underreach are somewhat subtler but no
less profound. Because underreach may be a rational political tactic for executives, as
explained above, it cannot be assumed that the problem will be limited to especially feckless
leaders or that it will be self-correcting through the electoral mechanism. On the contrary,
executive underreach may be self-perpetuating, insofar as it proliferates or deepens the set
of public problems that will eventually require an expensive response or conditions voters
to expect less from their officials. If not corrected quickly, underreach may also tend to foster
cynicism and distrust of government, diminish state capacity, exacerbate inequality, and
30 Tom Phillips, “So What?”: Bolsonaro Shrugs Off Brazil’s Rising Coronavirus Death Toll, GUARDIAN (Apr. 29,
2020), at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/29/so-what-bolsonaro-shrugs-off-brazil-rising-corona-
virus-death-toll.
31 But cf. Sen Pei, Sasikiran Kandula & Jeffrey Shaman, Differential Effects of Intervention Timing on COVID-
19 Spread in the United States (May 29, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.
gov/pmc/articles/PMC7273294/pdf/nihpp-2020.05.15.20103655.pdf (estimating that 54.0% of reported U.S.
deaths from COVID-19 as of May 3, 2020, could have been avoided if social distancing and other control measures
had been implemented just one week earlier).
32 Coronavirus Resource Center, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV., at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html.
33 See, e.g., Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE
L.J. 1011, 1097 (2003) (noting the “strong probability that measures used by the government in emergencies will
eventually seep into the legal system even after the crisis has ended”); Kim Lane Scheppele, Exceptions That Prove
the Rule: Embedding Emergency Government in Everyday Constitutional Life, in THE LIMITS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY 124 (Jeffrey K. Tulis & Stephen Macedo eds., 2010) (analyzing dozens of states of emergency to
show that they share in common an “emergency script” damaging to constitutional governance).
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stimulate dangerous or inefficient forms of self-help by private actors. More than that, exec-
utive underreach may tend to foster executive overreach by creating conditions of precarity or
unrest that will then be addressed through more legally questionable means. When the prob-
lem at issue has a transnational dimension, as with pandemics and climate change, all of these
harms may spill over across jurisdictions as well as administrations.
Whether and to what degree these harms will in fact materialize depends on many contex-
tual factors. But the harms are sufficiently plausible and worrisome that, as scholars of admin-
istrative law have observed, “there is no reason to be systematically more concerned with
overreaching than underreaching.”34 Pushing the observation further, there is no reason to
view overreach and underreach as diametrically opposed techniques of public administration.
In many scenarios, they may be better conceptualized as overlapping and complementary
modes of reactionary governance.
The COVID-19 crisis helps illustrate this point. Both President Trump and President
Bolsonaro have defended their underreach by appealing to populist themes and attacking
the legitimacy of domestic and international public health institutions. Both have tried to
compensate for or distract from their failures by manipulating the truth, denouncing the
media, and threatening to overreach on other margins, as by compelling states to reopen
or deploying military force against protesters.35 And both have contributed to cascading
health and economic crises that cannot be contained within their borders, that have especially
dire implications for vulnerable social groups, and that may have the effect of making autho-
ritarian regimes such as China look good by comparison.36 Their strategies share with
Orbán’s the corrosive effects of vilifying responsible actors while rewarding political allies.
Hence, although the previous Part highlighted the contrast between Orbán’s overreach
and Trump’s and Bolsonaro’s underreach, it is equally important to recognize the ways in
which all three countries’ responses to COVID-19 may be facilitating similar illiberal and anti-
democratic agendas.
IV. AN INTERNATIONAL (PRE-)LEGAL RESPONSE?
Domestic constitutional law struggles to deal with executive underreach. The United
States is especially inhospitable to legal challenges, given the degree to which its constitutional
text privileges negative liberties, the judiciary’s turn away from “structural” injunctions, and
the longstanding rule that executive nonenforcement decisions are presumptively unreview-
able.37 Other countries offer more avenues for redress. The Colombian Constitutional Court,
for instance, famously ordered the government in 2008 to reconfigure the public health
34 Jacob E. Gersen,Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201,
235 (discussing U.S. administrative agencies).
35 See, e.g., Robert Farley, Constitutional Experts: Trump Lacks Power to “Open Up the States,” FACTCHECK (Apr.
14, 2020), at https://www.factcheck.org/2020/04/constitutional-experts-trump-lacks-power-to-open-up-the-
states; Darlene Superville, Tim Sullivan & Aaron Morrison, Trump Threatens Military Force Against Protesters
Nationwide, AP NEWS (June 2, 2020), at https://apnews.com/a2797b342b4fc509e43f404817a56aa9.
36 SeeAlexandraMa,Trump’s Incompetent Response to the US Coronavirus Outbreak Is Helping China Look Good,
BUS. INSIDER (May 9, 2020), at https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-coronavirus-response-chaos-helps-china-
propaganda-2020-5.
37 See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
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system,38 while the German Federal Constitutional Court ordered the government earlier
this year to take a series of steps to ensure the legality of a European Central Bank asset-pur-
chase program.39 But most judiciaries have preferred to avoid issuing broad structural rem-
edies for underreach, and those they have tried have met with significant resistance.40 Efforts
to bring “actions for inaction” under Article 265 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union have been unsuccessful to the point of futility.41 In a dynamic crisis situa-
tion such as a pandemic, constitutional courts cannot be counted on to spur government
action in time to head off disaster. This is even truer of slower-moving and more remedially
constrained regional human rights bodies, which might be relatively sympathetic to claims of
state liability for failure to ensure the right to health, the right to life, or other positive
obligations.42
International law is long on possible theories for challenging underreach in a pandemic
but short on effective enforcement mechanisms. Canvassing the field, Talita de Souza Dias
and Antonio Coco have identified no fewer than five different sets of “due diligence”
obligations—grounded in international human rights treaties, the WHO’s International
Health Regulations, and the International Law Commission’s 2016 Draft Articles on
Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters, among other sources—that allegedly “require
States to take all feasible measures to contain the COVID-19 outbreak and prevent the virus
from spreading even further.”43 Although these obligations may be met in a variety of ways,
de Souza Dias and Coco conclude that “[t]he message of international law is clear: prevention
is better than cure, and States must do their best to achieve that . . . .”44 How this message can
be translated into practical results is not discussed. Yet if past is prologue, no government
body is likely ever to be held legally responsible for actions or omissions that have exacerbated
the pandemic.45 In international law as in domestic law, norms against underreach go
underenforced.
Given this state of affairs, it seems to us that correcting globally damaging underreach
requires a change at the level of international legal culture prior to, and perhaps in lieu of,
38 Corte Constitucional, Julio 31, 2008, Sentencia T-760/08, at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/rela
toria/2008/t-760-08.htm (in Spanish).
39 BVerfG, Judgment of the Second Senate of 05 May 2020, 2 BvR 859/15, at http://www.bverfg.de/e/
rs20200505_2bvr085915en.html (in English).
40 See, e.g., David Landau, The Reality of Social Rights Enforcement, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 189, 199–201 (2012)
(explaining that courts enforcing social rights generally have relied on “individualized” or “negative injunction”
remedies, rather than more systematic measures, with little impact on bureaucratic performance).
41 See Inga Dauks^ienė & Arvydas Budnikas, Has the Action for Failure to Act in the European Union Lost Its
Purpose?, 7 BALTIC J. L. & POL. 209 (2014).
42 Cf.Natasa Mavronicola, Positive Obligations in Crisis, STRASBOURGOBSERVERS (Apr. 7, 2020), at https://stras-
bourgobservers.com/2020/04/07/positive-obligations-in-crisis (discussing positive obligations under the
European Convention on Human Rights potentially applicable in the pandemic).
43 Talita de Souza Dias & Antonio Coco, Part III: Due Diligence and COVID-19: States’ Duties to Prevent and
Halt the Coronavirus Outbreak, EJIL: TALK! (Mar. 25, 2020), at https://www.ejiltalk.org/part-iii-due-diligence-
and-covid-19-states-duties-to-prevent-and-halt-the-coronavirus-outbreak.
44 Id. Other commentators have reached similar conclusions based on the right to health specifically. See, e.g.,
Dainius Pūras, Judith Bueno de Mesquita, Luisa Cabal, Allan Maleche & Benjamin Mason Meier, The Right to
Health Must Guide Responses to COVID-19, LANCET (June 20, 2020), at https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lan
cet/article/PIIS0140-6736(20)31255-1/fulltext.
45 See Matiangai Sirleaf, COVID-19 and Allocating Responsibility for Pandemics, JURIST (Mar. 31, 2020), at
https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2020/03/matiangai-sirleaf-responsibility-for-pandemics.
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changes at the level of legal substance. Because the problem of executive overreach is so famil-
iar and salient, legal observers tend to be on the lookout for it as soon as a real or alleged emer-
gency arises. The various international standards that have been proposed for regulating
domestic states of emergency reflect this tendency by focusing almost exclusively on what
must not be done.46 As far as we can tell, all of the major civil society efforts to monitor gov-
ernment responses to COVID-19 have similarly highlighted the risk of overreach while ignor-
ing or deemphasizing the risk of underreach. Consider, for example, the “COVID-19 Civic
Freedom Tracker”47 and the numerous compilations of states of emergency.48
Before international law can respond effectively to underreach such as President Trump’s
and President Bolsonaro’s, the balance of critical scrutiny must shift in its direction. By mov-
ing beyond the negative-liberty paradigm for assessing government performance in pandem-
ics and other emergencies—and in particular by naming and shaming underreach when it
threatens severe harm to health, security, or other basic goods—advocates and academics
can help lay a foundation for more successful legal and political challenges. We hope this
Essay contributes to that project.
46 See, e.g., Queensland Guidelines for Bodies Monitoring Respect for Human Rights During States of
Emergency, reprinted in 85 AJIL. 716 (1991); Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions
in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, reprinted in UN Doc. E/CN.4/1985/4.
47 Int’l Ctr. for Not-for-Profit L., COVID-19 Civic Freedom Tracker, at https://www.icnl.org/covid19tracker.
48 See, e.g., Ctr. for Civ. & Pol. Rts., Tracking Tool—Impact of States of Emergencies on Civil and Political Rights,
at http://ccprcentre.org/ccprpages/tracking-tool-impact-of-states-of-emergencies-on-civil-and-political-rights.
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